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        ABSTRACT 
Incarceration is common to nation-states of all types, yet its use varies greatly. What 
accounts for these variations? Are certain countries simply more criminogenic than 
others, or are more complex relations at play? With a sample of 118 countries, and the 
use of linear regression, the impact of social development, neoliberal politics, and social 
inequality are explored. Little to no support was found for social development 
hypotheses, while strong support was found for political variables. Contrary to previous 
research, unemployment was found to be negatively associated with the use of 
imprisonment. The relationship between crime and incarceration was discussed and a 
positive association was noted between the two.  
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Although incarceration is a common practice in nation-states of all types, the rate 
at which it is used varies greatly. In the United States, for example, incarceration occurs 
at a rate of 698 individuals per 100,000, whereas in Canada and Iceland it occurs at a rate 
of 106 and 45 respectively (World Prison Brief, 2016). What accounts for these 
variations? Are certain countries simply more criminogenic than others, or are more 
complex relations at play? In this paper I propose that the mechanisms involved in the 
cross-national variation of incarceration can be best assessed through a combination of 
political, economic, and social variables. Through an analysis of both sociological and 
criminological perspectives, this study situates the relevancy of each and provides insight 
as to where future research should focus.    
Furthermore, this study offers an important contribution to the literature by 
empirically grounding an otherwise theoretically saturated field. Since the carceral boom 
of the eighties, academics have postulated a host of theories to explain the unprecedented 
growth of the incarceration system. Relying on an extension of existing socio-political 
theories these accounts have remain devoid of empirical measurement and scrutiny. 
While the last decade has seen a rise in empirical investigations these studies have 
utilized small comparative samples with a limited number of explanatory variables. 
Building off of these limitations, the current study utilizes a large comparative sample of 
one-hundred and eighteen countries and an array of explanatory variables to gauge the 
impact of political, economic, and social factors.      
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Literature Review 
A limited body of research examines the mechanisms involved in the cross-
national variation of incarceration. As such, it will be necessary to draw on both the 
theoretical and empirical literature. I will begin by looking at the theoretical literature to 
establish a context for the scope and nature of empirical inquiry.  
 
Theoretical Investigations 
While many theoretical accounts have been put forward, three are particularly 
relevant to the global context of incarceration today: Garland’s (2001), Simon’s (2007) 
and Wacquant’s (2009). By focusing on the exceptionalism of the West, these theories 
help establish the legitimacy of a cross-national approach.  
In his account of American mass-incarceration, Garland (2001) focuses on the 
role of culture. The core of his argument is that contemporary American culture is 
saturated by perceived threats of insecurity. Historically rooted in rising crime rates 
coupled with political instability, crime, he argues, began to shape a new collective 
experience. Through the recursive channels of politics, policy, and public discourse, this 
experience grew and adapted to what Garland terms ‘the crime complex’, which pervades 
American culture today. As a result, he claims that everyday life is now negotiated with 
an explicit — albeit displaced—awareness of crime and a preoccupation with mitigating 
risk. 
Contrary to Garland’s bottom-up approach, Simon (2007) centers his analysis on 
the national politics of the American legislature. This shift in analysis results in the 
‘crime complex’ becoming an effect rather than a cause of crime control policies. Put 
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differently, Simon (2007) argues that the United States has embraced a discourse of 
governing through crime. While a seemingly contradictory approach, Simon (2007) 
argues that governing through crime arose quite naturally from the wake of political 
crises in the sixties and seventies. Kennedy’s assassination coupled with the Nixon 
scandals and other political shortcomings conveyed a message of poor executive 
leadership to the people. With the traditional leadership method under scrutiny, crime, he 
argues, was utilized as the new method of operating.  
Loic Wacquant (2009) offers perhaps the most nuanced perspective of the rise of 
mass-incarceration. At the core of his argument is the notion that neo-liberalism has come 
to dominate the national and trans-national structures of everyday life. Beginning in the 
early eighties, he argues, the state began a three-fold transformation that centered on the 
neo-liberal ideal. Economic development shifted outward, social programming withered 
inward and penal relations of all type flourished (Wacquant 2009:4). The impetus for 
such a grand transformation resided in, he argues, a shift in power relations between 
classes. An ever-growing transnational business class joined forces with national state 
officials and other high-ranking bourgeoisie to propagate a new era of political relations. 
The cultural effect of such changes has resulted in the acceptance of an “unrestrained 
individual responsibility”, where one’s social position and worth are determined solely by 
one’s will. This new rhetoric coupled with the trans-national reallocation of the unskilled 
labor market, cast those at the bottom a problem to be solved by the carceral state 
(Wacquant 2009:5).  
As a case in point Wacquant (2009) notes the “extrapenological” functions served 
by the American prison system (Wacquant 2009:196). In addition to housing offenders 
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on the objective grounds of societal safety, prisons now serve to control and affirm the 
further delineation of the lower class. Not surprisingly the chief recipients of such a 
regime have been African Americans. Noting the historical relations that placed African 
Americans on the periphery of society (chattel slavery, Jim Crow, the ghetto) coupled 
with the contemporary neoliberal agenda, Wacquant (2009) argues that mass 
imprisonment reflects a new form of control for displaced and stigmatized populations.   
 As demonstrated by the former three accounts, the underlying relations of 
incarceration are a contested issue. For Garland, the rise in incarceration is explained by 
culture, for Simon, it is explained by national politics, and for Wacquant, it is inextricably 
linked to the global political economy. In the next section the empirical literature will be 
reviewed. Like the theoretical debate, the empirical literature is rife with contention, 
inconsistency, and disagreement.   
 
Empirical Investigations  
In describing the empirical literature, I will follow the natural trajectory that the 
field of cross-national research has taken. This approach is useful as it allows for a 
historical grounding that highlights the development of theory and praxis. Traversing the 
literature in this way also allows for the logical elucidation of the gaps and voids that now 
exist. 
 One of the earliest empirical investigations to examine differences in cross-
national rates of imprisonment was conducted by Neapolitan (2001). In an attempt to link 
theory to practice, Neapolitan (2001) investigated three major perspectives: civilization 
theory, punishment and social structure, and societal inequality. The first perspective, 
5 
 
‘civilization theory’ postulated by Norbert Elias, argued that as nations become more 
modern and civil, social control mechanisms become less fundamental and wane. The 
second theory, postulated by Rusche and Kirchheimer, reversed the logic of Elias’s 
theory and argued that as capitalism moves onward, formal social control becomes 
necessary to regulate the surplus labor force. The final theory investigated was Wilkins 
and Pease’s theory of ‘societal inequality’. Taking on a somewhat cultural dimension this 
theory posited that punishment would reflect the general acceptance of inequality in any 
given society.  
 Having established the most relevant theories Neapolitan (2001) translated the 
theoretical arguments into empirical indicators. HDI scores were used to assess the 
civilization theory, unemployment rates were used to assess the theory of punishment and 
social structure, and income inequality coefficients were used to assess the societal 
inequality theory. Homicide rates and total crime rates were also included as explanatory 
variables.  Data for 148 countries were collected and ordinary least squares regression 
was used to examine cross-national variation in imprisonment. Interestingly, no empirical 
support was found for any of the theories. An important finding that did emerge, 
however, was that homicide rates were a significant predictor in the differential use of 
imprisonment. Previous research had hotly contested homicide’s relevance to 
incarceration.  
 Following the work of Neapolitan (2001), Jacobs and Kleban (2003) proposed 
that political explanations should also be examined. Given the States’ central role in the 
construction of crime and crime control policies they argued that the political aspects of 
incarceration should not be ignored. Of particular interest to their inquiry was how 
6 
 
centralized/decentralized and corporatist/federalist a given country was. Countries that 
are politically centralized, they explain, operate in ways that reduce public influence and 
thus insulate themselves from the public sentiment that can sway social policy. Likewise, 
corporatist arrangements are marked by elite decision-making models with 
complementary media coverage that serve as a buffer for social issues. They thus 
hypothesized that centralist-corporatist nations would incarcerate at a lesser rate then 
decentralized-federalist nations. While stressing the importance of political arrangements, 
Jacobs and Kleban (2003) also acknowledged that such explanations cannot account for 
all of the cross-national variation in incarceration. As a result, and given the success of 
national explanations of social control, they included measures of social-disorganization 
into their model. 
 With a sample of 13 of the most progressive democracies from 1970 to 1995 
Jacobs and Kleban (2003) used a panel design to estimate the political and social effects 
on incarceration rates. Measures of corporatism and federalism were represented by 
previously established scales, while measures of social disorganization were represented 
by eight unique indicators. In line with their hypothesis the macro-level effects of 
corporatism and federalism were found to explain cross-national variation in 
incarceration rates. As they noted, “both findings suggest that imprisonment rates are 
most substantial in nations where the public has the greatest political influence, whereas 
centralized, more hierarchical political arrangements contribute to an integrative penal 
system that stresses restitutive rather than harsh exclusionary reaction to crime” (Jacobs 
and Kleban 2003:746). In terms of social disorganization, they found that ethnic divisions 
7 
 
and out-of-wedlock birthrates helped explain cross-national variation while 
unemployment had no effect. 
 Taking the political explanation one step further, Sutton (2013) investigated the 
role of globalization on incarceration rates. In particular, he investigated whether or not 
countries have tended to converge under a neo-liberal agenda and to what extent this 
global polity can be used to explain incarceration rates. On one side of the debate, Sutton 
argues, are academics who claim that “transnational competition has encouraged cultural 
and political convergence among societies” (Sutton 2013:720). These academics point to 
the sweeping success of neoliberalism to suggest that convergence has either happened or 
is inevitable. In these countries incarceration rates were expected to be high on account of 
displaced social policy and liberal institutions. On the other side of the debate, Sutton 
argues, are academics who claim that while global pressure does exist, societies still react 
and adapt in different non-uniform ways.          
To test these competing arguments Sutton (2013) used a Bayesian change-point 
model with data from fifteen affluent capitalist democracies. Independent variables 
included indicators of life-course opportunities and distribution of political power. The 
results of the model found mixed support for both arguments. For example, the 
convergence argument was supported by an increase in average incarceration rates and a 
decline in social welfare and left-party influence. The heterogeneity argument was 
supported by the finding that union strength increased and countered the decline of left 
parties. Likewise, centralized societies were found to incarcerate at a lower rate than 
federalist societies.   
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Perhaps offering the most pervasive look of cross-national incarceration is 
Ruddell (2004). Building off of previous work in the field and extending his analysis to 
areas yet uncovered, he examined three factors that may be related to variation in 
imprisonment rates: type of legal system, transitioning democracies, and population 
heterogeneity. This combination of factors adds a further layer of complexity to the 
political and social context by situating both developed and developing countries in the 
purview of analysis.  
In his study, Ruddell (2004) used ordinary least squares regression models to 
estimate the former relationships. Eleven measures of crime, economic factors, social 
development factors, political factors, and demographic variables were used with a 
sample of 100 developed and developing nations. Three important findings followed: 
first, a consistent relationship was discovered between homicide rates and imprisonment 
rates for developed nations only. Second, common law legal systems were significantly 
associated with imprisonment rates. Third, controlling for all other factors, incarceration 
rates increased with population heterogeneity.   
 
Considerations 
 With the exception of Sutton (2013), most cross-national investigations are over a 
decade old. This lapse in time is quite significant, especially when considered alongside 
massive changes in the global incarceration trend. As a result, the foremost concern of the 
current study is to re-establish the trajectory of the field. By re-examining key elements 
of the former literature with a large comparative sample, this study offers a unique and 
promising vantage from which future research will prosper. The key themes of social 
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development, political development and social inequality will be explored. The precise 
manipulation of these themes, along with the broader methodological concerns will be 
elaborated upon in the following section. 
 
Methodology  
Sample 
The first step in selecting the sample was determining N. Since most other cross-
national research has employed relatively small samples (<50) it was decided to pursue a 
sample as large as logistically possible. Based on a precursory analysis of explanatory 
measures it was determined that a sample of 150 would be as large as one could go 
without compromising the integrity of the data. Having established N, inclusion in the 
sample was determined by selecting the top 150 countries based on their global 
democratic rank. World Audit releases an annual democratic ranking and their 2016 
results were used to select the final sample (an in-depth explanation of how countries 
were ranked will be clarified in the section on explanatory measures). Of the 150 
countries selected, 6 were removed from the sample because of missing data on the 
dependent variable. The countries removed were Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, North Korea, 
South Korea, Somalia, and Eritrea. Of the 144 remaining countries another 26 were 
removed because of missing data on one or more of the independent variables. The final 
sample included 118 countries (see appendix for the 118 countries included and the 
respective data for each).   
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Dependent Variable  
 Imprisonment data for 2016 was obtained from the Institute for Criminal Policy 
Research (ICPR). These data represent the imprisonment rate per 100,000 of the national 
population for each respective country. The mean incarceration rate was 166 per 100,000 
residents. Though there is some debate regarding the precision and utility of these data, 
other measures do not satisfy the logistical requirements of a large comparative sample. 
National-level indicators, like annual prison admissions and sentence severity, though 
useful, are not readily available.  
 
Explanatory Variables 
 Four explanatory variables were used for this research representing social, 
political, and economic indicators. These data came from a variety of sources, and 
following the caution of Neapolitan (2001), the inherent fallibilities associated with data 
collected in different manners and across time was recognized. While such shortcomings 
represent an obstacle to all cross-national research, standards continue to improve and 
analysis remains appropriate for the broad comparisons I am concerned with.  
 The first explanatory variable, HDI scores, was obtained from the United Nations 
Human Development Report. These data reflect a summary measure of human 
development across three dimensions: longevity, knowledge, and standard of living. The 
specific measures underlying the index include: life expectancy, mean years of schooling 
for adults over the age of 25, and gross national income (GNI) per capita (UNDP). 2014 
data was obtained for all countries in the sample. This variable was chosen to assess the 
social development hypotheses. 
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 The second variable, homicide rate, was obtained from the World Bank. This 
variable represents the intentional and unlawful killing of another person “as a result of 
domestic disputes, interpersonal violence, violent conflicts over land resources, intergang 
violence over turf or control, and predatory violence and killing by armed groups” 
(World Bank).  The homicide rate is expressed per 100,000 of the national population. 
Most of the data for homicide rate was obtained in 2013 but 2012 data was used when 
otherwise unavailable.  
 The third variable, unemployment, was obtained from the CIA World Factbook. 
This variable represents the percent of the labor force that is without a job. Most data 
were from 2015, but data going back to 2006 was used when necessary. 
 The fourth variable, democratic rank, was obtained from World Audit. These data 
reflect a country’s relative democratic standing. Countries are initially organized into four 
divisions based on their respective political rights and civil liberties, as measured by 
Freedom House. Next, rank is assigned within divisions by computing a mean for press-
freedom and corruption scores. The lower a country’s press freedom/corruption mean, the 
lower their democratic rank. Rank varied from 1 to 150, with 1 representing the most 
democratic. World Audit only audits countries with a population greater than one million. 
All data used was from 2016.  
 .  
Hypotheses 
 The four explanatory variables were transformed into three hypotheses. In 
hypothesis 1, the critical criminological argument that unemployment is inextricably 
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linked to rising incarceration rates was explored. Traditional streams of this perspective 
argue that unemployment is linked to incarceration through the commission of crime, 
while contemporary perspectives, like Wacquant’s (2009), argue that the relationship is 
one of political necessity based on a need to control the ever burgeoning surplus labor 
force.  Following these claims, it was hypothesized that: 
 H1: As unemployment increases so too does incarceration  
 
In hypothesis 2, HDI scores were utilized to assess the role of social development. 
While previous investigations found no support for developmental claims, they were 
conducted in a time of carceral stagnation. With a decisive shift in the expansion of 
incarceration, it was decided to re-examine the role of these variables. As such, it was 
hypothesized that:  
 H2: As society progresses through development and time, the use of incarceration 
will decrease 
 
 Hypotheses 3A and 3B, assess the political dimensions of incarceration. 
Concerned with the inter-related roles of democracy and neoliberalism, these hypotheses 
investigate the implications of political convergence. While Sutton (2013) found mixed 
support for this proposition, his investigation relied on a Bayesian change-point model 
with a small, and undefined, homogenous sample. With greater methodological 
awareness, and with a significantly larger sample, the political dimensions of democracy 
and convergence were re-explored. Accordingly, it was hypothesized that:  
H3A: As democracy increases the use of incarceration decreases 
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 H3B: Neoliberal-convergence, as exemplified through OECD membership, 
results in an increase in incarceration within those respective countries  
 
RESULTS  
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent 
variables. As demonstrated, significant variation was found across all variables with an 
especially large variation within incarceration rates. Given the broad comparative 
structure of this project these results were expected.         
 
Table 1: Descriptives 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
unemployment 118 .30 53.00 12.1890 10.77149 
incarceration rate 118 16 698 166.26 119.323 
HDI 118 .348 .944 .72349 .144483 
Rdemocracy 118 1 149 66.76 41.992 
homicide rate 118 .30 84.30 7.5932 11.78907 
Valid N (listwise) 118     
  
 
The large variation within incarceration rates, however, presented itself as an obstacle to 
the efficient modelling of the variables. This was combatted by transforming the 
incarceration rate into two subsequent measures, a mean-centered measure and a rank 
measure. In the former case, observations were mean-centered by subtracting the mean 
from the individual values, and in the latter, rank was determined by assigning 1 to the 
country with the highest incarceration rate and 118 to the country with the lowest 
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incarceration rate. Similar to the dependent variable, ‘Homicide’ and ‘HDI’ were mean-
centered to render a more appropriate intercept value.        
Missing data is a common issue with cross-national research (Marshall, 2004; 
Ruddell 2005; Neapolitan, 2001) and presented obstacles to this investigation. Of the 150 
countries initially pursued, 32 had to be removed because of missing data on one or more 
variable. Though a sizable proportion, it was decided to simply omit these countries and 
not use other methods of artificial substitution.  
Table 2 demonstrates the results from Model 1 where all four independent 
variables were considered within a linear regression framework. The model of fit was 
moderate with an adjusted r2 value of .311. All of the variables were statistically 
significant. As expected, homicide rate and democratic rank had a negative association. 
More surprising, however, was the finding that unemployment rate had a positive 
association, and HDI a negative association with incarceration rank.    
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Model 1 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 71.728 7.732  9.277 .000 
unemployment .639 .272 .202 2.346 .021 
Rdemocracy -.229 .080 -.282 -2.853 .005 
cHomicide -.870 .234 -.300 -3.719 .000 
cHDI -122.274 25.657 -.517 -4.766 .000 
 
a. Dependent Variable: Rank of Incarceration Rate 
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 While model 1 provides a sufficient framework to evaluate the first two 
hypotheses, it is not suitable for the evaluation of hypothesis 3B. As such, another model 
was generated in order to analyze the political dimension of OECD countries versus non-
OECD countries. In model 2, observations from the 20 OECD countries were isolated 
and regressed upon the dependent variable. Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of 
this sample while table 4 presents the coefficients of the linear regression. 
 
Table 3: OECD Descriptives 
Descriptive Statisticsa 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Rank of IncarcerationRate 72.70 31.893 20 
Unemployment 7.2250 2.87985 20 
cHomicide -6.3140 .73061 20 
Rdemocracy 11.45 8.069 20 
 
a. Selecting only cases for which OECD =  1.00 
 
Table 4: Model 2- OECD Regression Coefficients 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -92.798 51.914  -1.788 .093 
Unemployment 3.588 2.245 .324 1.598 .130 
cHomicide -26.000 7.582 -.596 -3.429 .003 
Rdemocracy -2.147 .793 -.543 -2.707 .016 
 
a. Dependent Variable: Rank of Incarceration Rate 
b. Selecting only cases for which OECD =  1.00 
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Similar to Model 1, democratic rank was a significant predictor of incarceration rank, 
where an increase in democratic rank was associated with a decrease in the use of 
incarceration. This finding was not expected as the convergence literature suggested that 
democracy should have a positive effect on the use of incarceration in neoliberal 
countries. The implications of both models are discussed below.  
 
Discussion 
While many noteworthy findings emerged, they must first be contextualized 
within the ‘crime/incarceration matrix’. When tracing the etiology of incarceration rates, 
crime rates present themselves as a logical beginning. Of course, in order to be sentenced 
to prison, a crime, or a belief thereof, must be present. The logic takes a simple linear 
form: incarceration is necessarily dependent on crime. While true, this line of reasoning 
fails to capture the complexity of the problem. For example, when a crime is tried before 
the courts, incarceration only represents one of several other responses. Sentences like, 
house arrest, community service, probation, and extrajudicial sanctions are all common 
alternatives. Since sentencing, whether custodial or otherwise, is largely dependent on the 
specific characteristics of the offence, ‘crime’ becomes too general of a term to 
substantiate as an identifiable cause.  
To further complicate the crime/incarceration problem is the distribution of 
offences to offenders. It has long been accepted within criminology that a majority of 
crime is committed by a minority of offenders. In order to have an impact on the crime 
rate, habitual offenders must be incarcerated at a greater rate than their counterparts. In 
this sense, the relationship between crime and incarceration becomes a matter of 
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probability. These sentiments are echoed in the dominant literature where it is argued that 
crime rates have a limited, if not an altogether null effect on incarceration rates (Levitt, 
2001; Liedka et al, 2006; Smith, 2004; Stemen, 2007). 
Collectively these considerations form a matrix where a constant interplay 
between crime and incarceration shapes the material existence of effective crime control. 
The relationship is summed up best by Jack Young who argues, “[the idea] that there is a 
direct and obvious relationship between high risk of imprisonment and the level of 
crime… is a classic of common sense, yet it is as incorrect as its opposite, the rather 
irritating liberal assumption that the crime rate has nothing whatsoever to do with the 
imprisonment rate” (as cited in The Punitive State, 37).   
While in full agreeance with this logic, I was nevertheless curious to see how the 
relationship was reflected in my data. Unfortunately, crime-rate data was not available, 
so, like previous investigations, homicide rates were used as a proxy. As a result, a 
strong-positive relationship was uncovered. This finding supports the former position that 
crime rates can have a meaningful impact on the use of incarceration. Though somewhat 
superficial, it nonetheless establishes a legitimacy for future inquiry into how this 
relationship is maintained. Perhaps homicide is a strong predictor of violent crime in 
general, and consequently, violent crime is a strong predictor of incarceration. Or maybe 
homicide is a proxy for a pattern of less serious crimes, and it is these latter crime-
patterns that explain the use of incarceration. Alternatively, homicide rates might have 
nothing to do with other crime patterns at all and might be better explained by cultural 
factors like population heterogeneity. In any event, the relationship between homicide 
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and incarceration needs to be explored in a more central way before its inclusion can be 
justified within a cross-national framework.       
Next, in exploring the root causes of incarceration, the crime/incarceration 
problem had to be navigated in a way that would acknowledge the influence of crime 
without being reduced to it. This was accomplished in hypothesis 1, for example, by 
assessing the impact of unemployment on incarceration. In-line with the tradition critical 
criminological stream, it was hypothesized that as unemployment increases so too would 
incarceration. Following these broad theoretical strokes, crime was hypothesized to play 
a mediating role. Contrary to these theories, however, it was found that unemployment 
was negatively associated with incarceration. This is surprising, especially within the 
context of the wider literature. While other investigations failed to find empirical support 
between unemployment and incarceration (Neapolitan, 2001) none uncovered an outright 
negative relationship. Part of the difficulty in interpreting these results has to do with the 
mediating role of crime. Historically, there may have been linear variation between 
unemployment and crime, and crime and incarceration, that no longer exists today. For 
example, the relationship between unemployment and crime might mirror the positive 
relationship of the past, while, the relationship between crime and incarceration may no 
longer bare any significance. This explanation seems even more plausible when 
considered alongside changes in penal philosophy. Unlike the eighties, nineties, and early 
millennia, the costs of incarceration represent a serious threat to economies and 
governments alike. Sentencing guidelines may therefore have changed in response to this 
financial crisis, where petty-crimes that were once associated with incarceration are now 
being sentenced otherwise.  
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Wacquant’s (2009) claim about political control, rather than crime, is much more 
difficult to assess. While this investigation uncovered a negative relationship, which 
invariably casts doubt on this proposition, Wacquant’s focus was on nations with strong 
neoliberal ties. Extending his argument beyond this scope was simply too grand. 
Nonetheless, the finding suggests that his claim is perhaps not as transnational as he 
sometimes suggests.     
In hypothesis 2 I explored the role played by societal progress on incarceration. 
Loosely based on Norbert Elias’s civilization theory, and in tandem with Neapolitan’s 
(2001) investigation, I examined the influence of HDI scores. In particular, I expected to 
find a strong negative relationship between these scores and incarceration rank. When 
originally tested by Neapolitan in 2001, no support for this hypothesis was found. 
Neapolitan (2001) did, however, suggest that perhaps his results were influenced by 
developing nations, where imprisonment lacked the material resources to both expand 
and establish itself as a dominant social institution. In the current study, I revisited this 
claim by testing Neapolitan’s hypothesis. Since his study, the incarceration trend has 
changed in a way that allows for the test of this proposition. Between 2000 and 2015 the 
world prison population has changed dramatically. Central American countries have seen 
an 80% growth, South American countries a 145% growth, and West African countries a 
40% growth (Walmsley, 2015). Based on Neapolitan’s predictions, civilization theory 
should now be of predictive value. Interestingly, HDI, though significant, lacked the 
anticipated direction of effect. Based on these findings it appears that civilization theory, 
as operationalized by Neapolitan (2001), holds little predictive value for the explanation 
of cross-national incarceration. 
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In hypothesis 3A and 3B I explored a political dimension of incarceration: the 
role of democracy. While democracy has been discussed in many cross-national 
investigations, none have included it as a singular measure. This is surprising, given how 
replete the literature is with reference to democracy as an essential mediator between 
trans-national competition and political convergence.  As such, and following Sutton’s 
(2013) investigation, I explored the influence of democracy on the use of incarceration. 
In hypothesis 3A I explored the influence of democracy on incarceration for the entire 
sample of 118 countries. This was needed to establish a baseline from which more 
refined measures could be compared. For example, perhaps convergence has not yet 
occurred and high levels of democracy are still associated with low levels of 
incarceration. Given the absence of data to the contrary, this was the relationship 
hypothesized. The regression resulted in a negative relationship between democracy and 
incarceration with significance at the .01 level. Though this neither proves nor disproves 
political convergence, it suggests that political heterogeneity is more readily observed at 
the global level.   
 In hypothesis 3B I refined my analysis to countries with strong neoliberal ties. 
This was accomplished by sorting countries by OECD status. Since OECD initiatives 
follow a strict neoliberal agenda, only countries that belong were included. This time it 
was hypothesized that as democracy increases so too would the use of incarceration. 
According to the convergence literature, democracy should be positively associated with 
incarceration in neoliberal countries, regardless of political convergence at the global 
level. Surprisingly this relationship was not observed, and similar to the results of 
hypothesis 3A, a negative relationship was noted. These findings have important 
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implications for the political convergence literature. Though democracy has been argued 
to play an important role in the relationship between transnational competition and 
political convergence, this research found no such effect. Political-economical theorists 
should now revisit this model and either abandon democracy as a mediator or 
hypothesize a new set of conditions under which it operates.   
 
Limitations 
Similar to other cross-national research, consistency of data was a serious 
limitation to this study. Measures like unemployment, homicide, and incarceration are 
measured in different ways and collected at different times across countries. Large time 
lapses in the collection of data meant that many countries had to be outright omitted from 
the analysis. Sampling was another issue that posed significant problems. In order to 
assess the three dimensions of concern, (social, economic, political) a criterion had to be 
selected that would allow for adequate analysis. I settled on democratic rank but this 
came with drawbacks of its own. For example, of the top ten countries with the highest 
incarceration rates only three could be included. Future researchers should not avoid 
large samples, but need to find a way to include countries that do not fit with common 
criterions. This is perhaps best achieved by narrowing the socio-economical-political 
gaze.    
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APPENDIX  
 
Sample and variables 
 
Country 
Incarceration 
Rate 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Homicide 
Rate HDI Democracy Rank 
Afghanistan 74 35.00 6.50 0.465 132 
Albania 189 18.00 4.00 0.733 60 
Algeria 162 10.60 1.30 0.736 91 
Argentina 160 7.30 7.00 0.836 64 
Armenia 130 17.60 2.00 0.733 94 
Australia 152 6.10 1.10 0.935 12 
Austria 95 5.60 0.70 0.885 14 
Bangladesh 43 5.00 2.80 0.570 99 
Belarus 306 0.70 3.60 0.798 141 
Belgium 105 8.50 1.80 0.890 8 
Bhutan 145 3.20 2.50 0.605 73 
Bolivia 122 7.30 12.10 0.662 60 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 73 43.90 1.20 0.733 79 
Botswana 188 17.80 15.40 0.698 40 
Brazil 301 4.80 26.50 0.755 54 
Bulgaria 125 11.20 1.50 0.782 46 
Cambodia 112 0.30 1.80 0.555 120 
Cameroon 115 30.00 2.80 0.512 114 
Canada 106 6.90 1.40 0.913 9 
Central African Republic 16 8.00 13.60 0.350 120 
Chile 242 6.30 3.10 0.832 21 
China 119 4.10 0.80 0.727 122 
Colombia 242 9.10 31.80 0.720 84 
Congo, Republic of the 27 53.00 10.50 0.591 109 
Costa Rica 352 8.60 8.40 0.755 22 
Croatia 81 20.30 1.10 0.818 34 
Cuba 510 2.70 4.70 0.769 119 
Czech Republic 200 7.70 0.90 0.870 25 
Denmark 61 4.90 0.70 0.923 1 
Dominican Republic 231 14.50 22.00 0.715 55 
Ecuador 162 4.30 12.40 0.732 70 
Egypt 76 13.00 3.40 0.690 111 
El Salvador 506 6.20 39.80 0.666 47 
Estonia 214 7.30 4.10 0.861 14 
Ethiopia 128 17.50 8.10 0.442 124 
Finland  57 8.70 1.70 0.883 1 
France 100 10.20 1.20 0.888 19 
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Gabon 210 21.00 9.60 0.684 109 
Georgia 274 12.40 4.30 0.754 44 
Germany 76 5.00 0.70 0.916 10 
Ghana 53 5.20 1.70 0.579 33 
Greece 90 26.60 1.40 0.865 53 
Haiti 102 40.60 10.20 0.483 107 
Honduras 196 4.30 84.30 0.606 111 
Hungary 187 7.70 2.70 0.828 41 
India 33 7.30 3.30 0.609 50 
Indonesia 67 5.90 0.60 0.684 60 
Iran 287 10.30 4.80 0.766 142 
Iraq 123 16.00 8.00 0.654 132 
Ireland 80 11.30 1.10 0.916 11 
Israel 256 5.90 1.70 0.894 31 
Italy 86 12.70 0.80 0.873 29 
Jamaica 145 14.20 42.90 0.719 37 
Japan 48 3.60 0.30 0.891 17 
Jordan 150 11.90 2.40 0.748 79 
Kazakstan 231 5.00 7.80 0.788 135 
Kenya 118 40.00 6.60 0.548 105 
Kuwait 92 3.00 1.90 0.816 78 
Kyrgyzstan 166 8.00 5.40 0.655 114 
Latvia 239 8.90 3.50 0.819 36 
Lesotho 92 26.10 38.00 0.497 51 
Libya 99 30.00 2.50 0.724 135 
Lithuania 268 10.70 6.80 0.839 23 
Madagascar 83 2.60 0.60 0.510 102 
Malaysia 171 2.90 1.90 0.779 82 
Mali 33 30.00 11.20 0.419 74 
Mauritania 44 31.00 11.40 0.506 86 
Mauritius 154 7.80 2.70 0.777 32 
Mexico 212 4.80 18.90 0.756 68 
Moldova 215 6.20 5.00 0.693 66 
Mongolia 266 7.70 7.50 0.727 35 
Morocco 222 9.70 1.30 0.628 100 
Mozambique 57 17.00 3.70 0.416 79 
Namibia 144 28.10 17.50 0.628 39 
Nepal 59 46.00 2.90 0.548 98 
Netherlands 69 7.40 0.70 0.922 5 
New Zealand 194 5.70 1.00 0.913 7 
Nicaragua 181 6.00 11.30 0.631 91 
Niger 39 5.10 4.70 0.348 83 
Nigeria 31 23.90 10.30 0.514 96 
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Norway 71 3.50 0.90 0.944 4 
Oman 36 15.00 1.20 0.793 94 
Pakistan 43 6.80 7.80 0.538 108 
Panama 392 4.50 17.20 0.780 57 
Papua New Guinea 61 1.90 10.40 0.505 75 
Paraguay 158 7.30 8.90 0.679 70 
Peru 247 5.50 6.70 0.734 59 
Philippines 121 6.80 9.30 0.668 55 
Poland 186 12.30 0.80 0.843 23 
Portugal 138 13.90 1.30 0.830 20 
Romania 143 6.80 1.50 0.793 44 
Russia 447 5.20 9.00 0.798 129 
Saudi Arabia 161 11.60 6.20 0.837 102 
Senegal 62 48.00 8.10 0.466 51 
Serbia 148 19.70 1.50 0.771 47 
Singapore 227 2.00 0.30 0.912 72 
Slovakia 183 12.80 1.40 0.844 28 
Slovenia 73 13.10 0.60 0.880 25 
South Africa 292 25.10 31.90 0.666 43 
Spain 133 24.50 0.60 0.876 27 
Sudan  50 13.60 6.50 0.479 144 
Sweden 55 7.90 0.90 0.907 1 
Switzerland 84 3.20 0.70 0.930 6 
Tajikistan 121 2.50 1.50 0.624 132 
Thailand 468 0.80 4.90 0.726 111 
Trinidad and Tobago 258 3.30 28.30 0.772 42 
Tunisia 212 14.90 3.10 0.721 57 
Turkey 228 10.00 4.30 0.761 88 
Turkmenistan 583 11.00 4.30 0.688 149 
Ukraine 193 9.30 4.30 0.747 69 
United Arab Emirates 229 2.40 0.60 0.835 76 
United Kingdom 367 6.20 1.00 0.907 12 
United States 698 6.20 3.80 0.915 14 
Uruguay 291 6.60 7.70 0.793 17 
Venezuela 159 7.00 53.60 0.762 143 
Vietnam 154 3.40 1.50 0.666 130 
Yemen 53 27.00 7.00 0.498 140 
Zambia 125 15.00 6.20 0.586 90 
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